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THE CHANGING DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF DEVELOPMENT
It seems strange now to say so, but until the last war nobody 
discussed 'development ' in the sense of the economic development 
of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Previously, 
if people thought about objectives for these areas they used 
vague concepts such as 'progress' or 'modernization'.
The concern with 'development ' in this sense has been in fact 
a consequence of the break-up of the big colonial empires since 
the war. Dr. Kaunda once said to me: "After political indepen­
dence in Zambia, we must achieve economic development". At the 
time, this was thought of as catching up with Europe. The U.S. 
and European governments broadly accepted this aim, in part at 
least because of the fear of the former colonies going communist.
A convenient yardstick, the national income per head of the 
population, had also come into common use by the 1950s. So 
catching up with Europe could be measured by the growth of 
per capita income. At that time, economic growth in this sense 
was almost a synonym for development.
Moreover, the orthodoxy then current showed how this could be 
achieved. It required above all capital investment. Using 
the model devised by Sir Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar which linked 
investment and changes in income, one could estimate how much 
investment would be needed to achieve a particular national 
income target. And since one could also make a rough guess at 
how much of this need could be covered by local savings, it was 
possible to deduce how much capital would be required in the form 
of aid and/or private investment. (In terms of this sort of 
model it did not matter very much whether aid or private invest­
ment filled the 'gap'.) Capital was also needed, from other 
points of view, to provide the technology and foreign exchange 
needs of economic growth.
There was in fact a development 'paradigm', providing quanti­
tative links between (i) politically important economic targets, 
(ii) a government's economic policies and (iii) its need for 
external finance. This analytical framework was very simple 
and it suggested solutions to political problems : so it exerted
a powerful appeal. It implied that 'underdeveloped' countries
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should give up nationalist policies of protecting local indus­
tries so it was attractive to the governments and financial 
interests of the leading industrial countries. Moreover, it 
provided arguments to those in ’underdeveloped ’ countries who 
considered themselves modern. If governments opened their doors 
to foreign capital and technology, their countries need not 
remain ’underdeveloped’. This approach held therefore a further 
attraction: it was optimistic, even if the grounds for optimism
were rarely spelled out.
The'development ' plans of the post-war era (actually growth plans) 
have been built on this paradigm, and it has been the central 
justification for aid programmes, through which ’developed' 
countries would help the 'less developed’ catch up. Social 
targets, at least until the 1970s, were usually subsidiary to 
growth. Lower unemployment and greater equality, even parliamen­
tary democracy, would, it was assumed, be achieved if per capita 
incomes rose to high enough levels. But the emphasis must be 
on growth;, redistribution could come later.
This was the justification for the United Nations target of 5% 
national income growth by the end of the 1960s for the 'under­
developed ’ countries. When this target was put forward in the 
late 1950s, many European diplomats privately thought it 
absurdly high. But there was general agreement that if the 
'underdeveloped' countries grew at anything like this pace, big 
social and political advances would be feasible.
Actually, the opposite seems to have occurred. To measure the 
national income in countries with large numbers of people in 
subsistence agriculture (or even to define ’income’ in this sector)- 
is in fact very difficult. But, for what they are worth, the 
national income estimates of ’underdeveloped ' countries suggest 
that the growth rate for this group as a whole did accelerate to 
about 5% by 1970 (with big differences between countries, of 
course) and to have maintained this rate into the 1970s. This 
is something quite new in the world: this area had been economically
stagnant for the whole of past history. But unemployment and 
inequality appear to have become if anything more severe, and 
country after country has fallen under military dictatorships.
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To generalise drastically, what has been happening is that 
growth has been concentrated very largely in a few industries 
using imported technology, and associated sectors such as 
transport, banking and public administration, mostly in the 
big cities. Here a small minority are able to live more or 
less 'modern' lives, copied from overseas. But fiscal and 
banking systems have turned out to be too weak to spread the 
benefits of growth. Country districts (and parts of cities) 
have remained slums: indeed some rural industries, notably
the handloom weavers of South Asia, have been virtually wiped 
out. And those who did benefit have turned to the military to 
protect their gains. So growth is not followed automatically 
by redistribution or democracy. On the contrary, the typical 
fast growth policies seem both to require and to induce 
oppression.
From a social and political point of view, what matters in fact 
is not so much the pace of growth as its pattern. There has 
been a general realisation that growth as such cannot be called 
development. Hence the rising interest in the 1960s in 'social 
indicators' (such as measures of nutrition and mortality), and 
in the 1970s in 'basic needs', not only in national planning 
offices but also in some aid agencies (especially those of the 
Netherlands and Sweden, and the ILO). This approach implies 
priorities for investment in agriculture and rural industries, 
and for the adaptation of technology in all sectors so that a 
given quantum of investment provides more jobs.
Another element has also now entered the picture. Although 
economic growth had been expected to bring not only social wel­
fare and democracy but also greater independence, here too it has 
had the opposite effect. The fast-growing countries - especially 
the smaller ones - may have become less dependent on the exports 
of a narrow range of primary commodities, but they have become 
more dependent on imports of foreign equipment, technology and 
fuel, obtained mainly through the multi-national corporations.
For most of them, foreign exchange problems remain therefore 
as chronic as ever, or more so.
The dawning realisation of this led to the 'dependency ' theories
which emerged in Latin America - e.g. the work of Osvaldo Sunkel 
of Chile and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil. Here was the 
origin of the doctrine of 'self-reliance ' which does not mean 
autarchy but a much more selective approach to foreign capital 
than was customary in the 1950s. Self-reliance is now seen not 
merely as a means to development, but as one element in its 
definition. Development has had to accommodate nationalism - 
with which it once seemed scarcely compatible.
The oil crisis of 1973 -74 underlined the vulnerability of many 
of the new industrial structures, and raised the spectre of an 
international struggle for oil and other resources. The experts 
of the Club of Rome had already been making similar warnings.
But their exaggerated style and their tendency to raise many 
bogies had blunted their impact. The oil crisis did, however, 
really cast considerable doubt on the previous unthinking optimism 
that sooner or later everyone in all parts of the world would be 
able to enjoy a European standard of life. It is conceivable 
that with nuclear power and other non-conventional sources, the 
industrial countries will be able to solve their energy problem 
in the 1990s; it is hard to see how countries like India could 
possibly find the immense capital needed.
However, the success of OPEC had another effect. It not only made 
"A New International Economic Order" more necessary for the 
rest of the ’Third World’ it also provided them with moral and 
political support.
The NIEO includes many demands which are familar to those who 
have followed the long and sterile UNCTAD negotations on aid, 
tariff concessions and commodity price stabilisation. But there 
is a new insistence on national sovereignty over sub-soil minerals, 
on monitoring the multinational corporations, and on obtaining 
a much bigger share in world industrial output. In brief, it is 
a demand for redistribution of economic power, such as has 
already been partially achieved inside industrial countries, but 
on a world scale.
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The oil crisis had still another effect. It aggravated the 
foreign exchange difficulties of a number of European countries 
normally classed as 'developed', especially Portugal and Italy, 
but also Britain. Indeed, many began to show what had 
previously been considered the classic Latin American combin­
ation of chronic inflation and heavy unemployment (which can 
hardly co-exist simultaneously for long, according to Keynesian 
economics) not to speak of political instability and a high 
degree of concentration of economic power.
There is now a growing tendency to extend the concept of 
'development ' to Europe itself. The dividing line between 
'developed ' and 'developing' countries has in any case become 
increasingly blurred, even in terms of per capita income.
While there are of course many differences between (say)
Italy and Argentina, it may for some purposes be worth stress­
ing their common problems - e.g. how best to select and p u r c h a s e  
the technology they require, and thus how to handle the multi­
national corporations, the main sources of the technology.
These are now clearly big issues for Britain too (e.g. over 
North Sea Oil, pharmaceuticals and automobiles). Ensuring that 
'their own ' corporations follow policies in the national 
interest, in some sense, can even be a problem for the govern­
ments of the United States and West Germany, if not Japan.
Taking 'development studies ' out of the tropics - which is 
what this means - brings an immediate diplomatic payoff. The 
subject is now no longer so paternalistically concerned with 
showing countries overseas how to develop and solve their 
problems of poverty. Research and teaching programmes increas­
ingly contain European case studies as well as those of the 
'Third World '.
In any case, the political basis of the old aid-oriented 
approach has dwindled, and the governments of European countries 
are less concerned with the question: what can we do for poor
countries? than with another one: what are the mutual interests
rich countries and poor ? Research studies now going on 
(e.g. in OECD and also in the British and French Governments) 
deal with questions such as : How compatible is the development
of the Third World, especially that of the 'newly industrialized
countries' or NICs (such as Brazil and South Korea) with the 
economic growth needed in Europe to cut down unemployment?
What modus vivendi can be worked out with the NICs? Which 
of the many demands in the New International Economic Order 
can industrial countries afford to concede? And do the richer 
members of the EEC have the resources both to enlarge and 
change the Community and also to continue investment in other 
continents? It is safe to predict that the report of the 
Brandt Commission will deal with these topics, not primarily
with aid, the focus of its predecessor, the Pearson Commission.
'Development ' is ultimately about a broader - and non-quanti- 
fiable - problem into which all these questions f i t : quite
simply, can we construct a world capable of digesting tech­
nological advance and also surviving the next round of oil price 
rises and less predictable crises? This must mean a more 
equitable world. Unless we can bring it to birth, we face a 
future of growing turmoil, and no society will escape unharmed, 
however stable it looks today.
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